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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Scott Lippert appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of sex abuse of a child under the age of
16.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Lippert's adult daughter reported to the authorities that Lippert had
sexually abused her when she was a teenager. (#33028 R., pp.10-11 .1)
Following an investigation, the state arrested Lippert and charged him with sex
abuse of a child under 16.

(#33028 R., pp.10-11, 43.)

The district court

appointed the public defender to represent Lippert. (#33028 R., pp.32-34.)
At a pre-trial hearing, Lippert expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney,
and requested substitute counsel be appointed. (#33028 Tr., Vol. 11, 2 p.18, L.13 p.20, L. 7.) Specifically, Lippert told the district court that he was dissatisfied with
the lack of "substantial discussion" with his appointed counsel about his case,
1

The Idaho Supreme Court ordered that the appellate record in this case be
augmented with the clerk's records and transcripts filed in Lippert's prior appeal,
State v. Lippert, Docket No. 33028. (3/6/11 Order.)
2

The appellate record from Lippert's prior appeal, Docket No. 33028 contains
two reporter's transcripts. Volume I contains transcripts of pre-trial hearings held
on October 19, 2005, and the afternoon of November 16, 2005. (See #33028
Tr., Vol. I.) Volume II contains transcripts of a pre-trial hearing held on the
morning of November 16, 2005; pre-trial motion hearings of January 4 th and 6th
2006; the four-day jury trial from January 23-26, 2006; and the sentencing
hearing from April 27, 2006. (See #33028 Tr., Vol. 11.) The state cites these
transcripts as "Vol. I," and "Vol. II," respectively. The appellate record in the
Lippert's current appeal, Docket No. 38613 contains only one transcript, from a
Tr.) The state cites this transcript
September 15,
. 2008 motion hearing. (See
simply as "Tr."
1

and that he did not agree with his counsel on how his case was to be handled.
(Id.)

Lippert's counsel told the court that he did not think the attorney-client

relationship had broken down, but that he did not object to substitute counsel
being appointed. (#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.19, Ls.4-9.) The district court denied
Lippert's request for substitute counsel.

(#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.20, L.8 - p.21,

L.14.)
On the scheduled day of trial, Lippert initially refused to leave his jail cell.
(#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.166, L.15 - p.169, L.18.) After the district court directed the
jailors to bring Lippert to court (#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.172, L.19 - p.173, L.1),
Lippert explained that he had not been given notice of the trial date, that he had a
severe headache, and that he was dissatisfied with his appointed counsel
(#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.174, L.5 - p.179, L.2). He also continuously asserted that
he was unrepresented.

(Id.)

Eventually, the trial commenced with Lippert's

participation. (See generally, #33028 Tr., Vol. I.)
The jury found Lippert guilty of sex abuse of a child under 16. (#33028 R.,
pp.176-177.)

Lippert's appointed attorney continued to represent him through

sentencing, where the district court imposed a unified fifteen year sentence with
six years fixed. (#33028 R., pp.184-185; #33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.479, L.5- p.547,
L.18.) Lippert timely appealed. (#33028 R., pp.186-188.)
On appeal, Lippert argued that the district court erred in admitting certain
I.RE. 404(b) evidence of Lippert's prior sexual misconduct, and that the district
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry regarding Lippert's request for
substitute counsel. See State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App.

2

2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Lippert's conviction, holding that the
probative value of the evidence of uncharged incidents of sexual misconduct was
not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

&

at _ , 181 P.3d at 515-518.

However, a majority of the Court also held that the district court failed to give
Lippert a full and fair opportunity to present facts and reasons in support of his
motion for substitute counsel.

&

at

, 181 P.3d at 518-523.

The Court

remanded the case for a determination of whether Lippert had good cause for
appointment of new counsel, and instructed the district court to grant Lippert a
new trial if it found such good cause.

&

On remand, the district court conducted a hearing, and considered briefing
and argument on the issue of Lippert's request for substitute counsel. (R., pp.2035; see generally, Tr.)

Lippert (who was at this point represented by private

counsel), and his formerly appointed trial counsel testified at the hearing. (Tr.,
p.8, L.14 - p.76, L.5.)

In a memorandum opinion, the district court concluded

that Lippert failed to show good cause for substitution of counsel, and denied
Lippert's motion. (R., pp.36-52.) Lippert timely appealed. (R., pp.70-72.)

3

ISSUE
Lippert states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint
substitute counsel to represent Mr. Lippert because a complete,
irrevocable breakdown of communication between Mr. Lippert and
his counsel existed?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Lippert failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for substitute counsel?

4

ARGUMENT
Lippert Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Motion For Substitute Counsel
A.

Introduction
Lippert contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motion for substitute counsel.

(See generally, Appellant's brief.)

Specifically,

Lippert contends that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
Lippert failed to show good cause in the form of a "complete, irrevocable
breakdown of communication" with his appointed counsel. 3 (Id.) A review of the
record reveals that the district court considered the proper factors in considering
Lippert's request and properly exercised its discretion in denying Lippert's
motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel for an indigent

defendant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. I.C. § 19-856; State v.

3

Lippert also alleged, for the first time during the hearing on his motion for
substitute counsel after remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals that there was
an actual conflict between himself and his appointed counsel. (Tr., p.10, L.2 p.12, L.25.) Specifically, Lippert alleged that his aunt had retained and then fired
his appointed counsel in a divorce proceeding in the late 1970s or early 1980s,
and his appointed counsel had also previously represented an opposing party in
a property dispute involving Lippert. (Id.) In response, Lippert's appointed
counsel testified that he had never heard of Lippert's aunt and did not start
practicing law until 1987, and that he could not recall ever representing an
opposing party to Lippert in any property dispute. (Tr., p.51, L.7 - p.52, L.19.)
The district court concluded that Lippert failed to show an actual conflict of
interest. (R., pp.39-40.) While Lippert references his allegations of an actual
conflict in his statement of facts in his Appellant's brief (Appellant's brief, pp.1-2),
he does not allege on appeal that the district court erred in finding that no actual
conflict existed.
5

Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); State v. Clayton,
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980).
Credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Lippert Failed To Show A "Complete, Irrevocable
Communication" With His Appointed Counsel

Breakdown

Of

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,§ 13
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel, though not necessarily
the right to the attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058,
772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989).

While the Sixth Amendment guarantees

counsel who "function[s] in the active role of an advocate," Entsminger v. Iowa,
386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967), it does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship"
between an accused and his counsel.

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-15

(1983).
A trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an
indigent defendant for "good cause." I.C. § 19-856; Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897,
606 P.2d at 1001; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct.
App. 1997).

Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not

necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980);
Peck 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353.

6

Instead, "good cause" for the

appointment of substitute counsel generally requires either an actual conflict of
interest;

a

complete,

irrevocable

breakdown

of

communication;

irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.

or

an

Lippert, 145

Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 522-523 (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320
(8 th Cir. 1991 ); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2 nd Cir. 1981 ); United States
v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10 th Cir. 2002)). The trial court must afford the
defendant a full and far opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of
a motion for substitution of counsel having been made aware of the problems
involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d 1002. A court must also balance
a defendant's choice of counsel against the "need for the efficient and effective
administration of criminal justice." United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166
(10 th Cir. 1980).
In Lott, a case cited in the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth factors to be used in examining
constitutional implications of a total breakdown in communication: "(1) whether
the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the trial court
adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the motion; (3) whether
the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown."
Lippert, 145 Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 523 (citing Lott, 310 F.2d at 1250); see also
Romero v. Furlong, 215 F.3d 1107, 1113-1114 (10 th Cir. 2000) (discussing the

7

four factors used to examine constitutional implications of lawyer/defendant
communication breakdown relied upon in Lott).
It is difficult for a defendant to show a "total breakdown in communication,"
whether or not a court specifically utilizes the Lott factors. See United States v.
Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1025 (10 th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the "defendant's
burden to meet [the Lott] standard," and holding that "without any evidence
precluding the possibility of mere strategic disagreement or suggesting such a
'total breakdown in communication,' we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion in denying [the defendant's) motions."); United States v. John Doe #1,
272 F.3d 116, 122-126 (2 nd Cir. 2001) (holding that a total breakdown in
communication had not occurred when the defendant made threats of physical
violence to his counsel and his counsel's family, and when he alleged that his
defense counsel had repeatedly lied to him, because while the rift between
defendant and counsel was "at times intense," defense counsel was able to carry
out his duties and some communication did take place); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133
F.3d 1253, 1276-1277 (9 th Cir. 1998) (substitution of counsel not warranted
where record showed counsel and defendant communicated, although defendant
complained about inadequate time meeting with counsel and counsel's "gloomy
predictions."). Such a high standard is necessary to prevent a defendant from
paralyzing the criminal proceedings against him based on circumstances falling
short of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.
Upon remand from the Idaho Court of Appeals, the district court
recognized and applied the four factors from Lott. (R., pp.38-48.) The district

8

court then properly utilized its discretion in concluding that Lippert failed to show
good cause for the substitution of appointed counsel. (R., pp.36-52.)
First, the district court concluded that Lippert's request for substitute
counsel, made on the morning of his jury trial, was timely. (R., p.38 n.3) The
district court cited State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632, 634 (Ct.
App. 2002), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a motion for selfrepresentation
commencement

was

timely when

of meaningful

empanelment of a jury.

it was

trial

made

proceedings,

(R., p.38, fn.3.)

any time

prior to

the

including

prior to

the

The state asserts that a motion for

substitute counsel is not analogous to a motion for self-representation. On the
contrary, a motion for substitute counsel that would necessitate a continuance if
granted, such as a motion made for the first time on the day of trial, is not "timely"
in a Lott analysis.

See State v. Clark, 698 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. 2005)

(defendant's motion for substitute counsel made on the morning of trial, on the
second day of jury voir dire, was untimely); U.S. ex rel. Guillen v. DeRobertis,
580 F.Supp. 1551, 1554-1555 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (when defendant made request for
new counsel on the day trial was to begin, and he had not indicated his
dissatisfaction with counsel prior to that time, trial court did not abuse discretion
in denying request, because it was likely motion was made to delay); U.S. v.
Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1034-1035 (9 th Cir. 2010) (regardless of when
defendant makes motion for substitution of counsel, "the court must make a
balancing determination, carefully weighing the resulting inconvenience and
delay against the, defendant's important constitutional right to counsel of his

9

choice." (citations omitted)).

However, in this case, Lippert initially requested

substitute counsel at a pre-trial hearing approximately six weeks prior to the jury
trial (#33028 Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.13 - p.20, L.7). 4

On the basis of that prior

request, the state agrees with Lippert and the district court that his motion for
substitute counsel was timely.
Second, the district court adequately inquired into the grounds for Lippert's
motion for substitute counsel by conducting a hearing specifically on that issue,
and by considering briefing and argument from both parties before issuing a
memorandum decision. (R., pp.20-52; see generally, Tr.) Lippert concedes on
appeal, as he did below, that the district court's inquiry was adequate. (R., p.23,
Appellant's brief, p.7.)

Indeed, in gaining the opportunity to fully prepare for,

testify at, and cross-examine his former appointed attorney at a dedicated
hearing on his motion for substitute counsel, Lippert enjoyed more extensive
protections than are required by the law in ordinary circumstances. Rios-Lopez
v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343-344, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278-1279 (Ct. App. 2007) (a
district court is not required to conduct a hearing in order to afford a full and fair
opportunity for a defendant to pursue his motion for substitute counsel).
Third, the district court concluded that Lippert failed to provide evidence of
a severe or pervasive conflict with his appointed counsel, or that he had such
4

Though Lippert requested substitute counsel at both a November 16, 2005 pretrial hearing, and the morning of trial, the Idaho Court of Appeals, on remand,
instructed the district court to consider only Lippert's request for counsel made on
the morning of trial. (#33028 Tr., Vol. II p.18, L.13 - p.20, L.7; #33028 Tr., Vol. I,
p.174, L.5 - p.179, L.2; Lippert at_, 181 P.3d at 518-523.) The district court
recognized this instruction (R., p.2 n.1), but properly considered all of the
circumstances of the criminal proceedings that led up to Lippert's final request for
substitution of counsel (R., pp.36-52).
10

minimal contact with his counsel that meaningful communication was not
possible.

(R., pp.41-46.)

While Lippert claimed that he wrote several

unanswered notes to his appointed counsel in the months prior to the trial, and
that his appointed counsel refused to communicate with him in preparing for trial
(Tr., p.13, L.19 - p.14, L.3), Lippert's appointed counsel testified that he actually
had significant communications with Lippert prior to the jury trial. At the hearing
on Lippert's motion, Lippert's appointed counsel testified that he: visited Lippert in
jail 13 times, discussed and agreed upon the disqualification of the initially
assigned district court trial judge, spoke with Lippert prior to and after the
preliminary hearing, provided Lippert with all of the discovery provided by the
state, tracked down two out-of-state potential witnesses as requested by Lippert
(but then elected not to subpoena those witnesses after Lippert told him they
would lie at the jury trial), and discussed Lippert's right not to testify at trial. (Tr.,
p.54, L.19 - p.66, L.22.)
A review of the record reveals Lippert's communications with his
appointed counsel continued through the day before the jury trial and the trial
itself.

On the morning of trial, when the district court was trying to ascertain

Lippert's position with regard to attending trial, Lippert's appointed counsel told
the court that on the previous day he visited Lippert at jail and discussed the jury
list, reviewed a transcript of a prior proceeding, and discussed what Lippert
would wear at the trial. (#33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.166, L.21 - p.168, L.3.) At the jury
trial itself, Lippert passed notes to his appointed counsel, and was able to
engage in direct examination with him when Lippert testified in his own defense.

11

(Tr., p.64, Ls.21-23, p.75, L.14- p.76, L.3; #33028 Tr., Vol. I, p.343, L.9 - p.357,
L.9.) While Lippert may have desired more personal contact with his appointed
defense attorney, the existing communication fell far short of a "complete,
irrevocable breakdown of communication."
Fourth, the district court found that Lippert substantially contributed to the
communication issues between rlimself and his appointed attorney. (R., pp.4648.)

Lippert's appointed counsel testified that Lippert was uncooperative and

difficult to deal with and would not discuss the case in details beyond affirmations
of his innocence, and the expression of beliefs that the victim and other
witnesses were lying.

(Tr., p.62, Ls.14-18, p.66, Ls.19-22, p.72, L.1 - p.73,

L.11.) The private counsel Lippert retained for the hearing on remand from the
Idaho Court of Appeals acknowledged Lippert is "a little on the stubborn side."
(R., p.24.)

Having observed Lippert's obstructionist behavior firsthand, the

district court noted that "[b]ased upon [its] own observations and the testimony
provided at the recent hearing, [it] is not persuaded that the fault for a possible
lack of communication should be laid squarely on appointed counsel alone, but
that Mr. Lippert substantially contributed to any breakdown of communication by
his own actions." (R, p.48.)
On appeal, Lippert merely second-guesses the conclusion of the district
court. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) He also repeats some complaints made
below about his appointed counsel's performance (including allegations that his
counsel was unprepared, had "alcohol on his breath" and that he could not "track
in court") (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8; Tr., p.14, L.25-p.15, L.4, p.19, Ls.21-25),

12

that do not address the claimed breakdown in communication and would be more
appropriately brought in a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. 5
While Lippert's relationship with his appointed defense counsel was
clearly somewhat rocky, he has failed to show that an irrevocable breakdown of
communication occurred. Lippert has thus failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for substitute counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lippert's judgment of
conviction for sex abuse of a child under 16.
DATED this 28th day of December 2011.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

5

As the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized, an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is separate from a motion for substitute counsel, and Lippert is not
precluded from making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following the
resolution of his direct appeal. Lippert, 145 Idaho at_ n.4, 181 P.3d at 523 n.4.
13
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